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Attacking Military Environmental Cleanup on Foreign Soil:
Should CERCLA Principles Apply?
Randon H. Draper'
I. Introduction
On December 3, 2003, a United States District Court held in
Arc Ecology v. U.S. Dept. of the Air Force2 [hereinafter Arc'
Ecology] that Filipino citizens had standing to bring suit against
the United States military under the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act [hereinafter CERCLA]
for an action to compel the United States government to conduct
preliminary assessments of the environmental damage to former
U.S. military bases in the Philippines. 3 However, the court also
held that CERCLA does not apply extraterritorially.4 Accordingly,
the District Court granted the government's motion to dismiss the
suit.
5
While the Arc Ecology court correctly interpreted CERCLA's
current scope to be limited to domestic or national applications, the
court's ruling not to extend the statute extraterritorially begs the
questions: Should the law be changed to embrace CERCLA
I Bachelor of Arts (B.A.), University of Utah, 1989, Juris Doctor (J.D.),
University of Idaho, 1992. This article is in partial completion of a Masters of
Laws (LL.M.) from the University of Utah. Randon H. Draper is a member of
the bar of Washington State and Utah. He is a practicing attorney with the
United States Air Force Judge Advocate's Corps. The views expressed in this
article belong exclusively to the author and do not represent the views of the
United States Air Force or Department of Defense. Dedicated to my children,
Andrew, Daniel, Parry, Shayla and Branson Draper.
2 294 F.Supp.2d 1152 (N.D.Cal. 2003).
3 Id. at 1155.
4 Id. at 1159.5 Id. at 1160.
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principles in the cleanup of overseas military bases? If so, what
principles should apply? Is a compromise possible?
This article provides background to better help understand
these questions, and suggests possible answers. In Section II, this
article briefly explores the extent of the U.S. military's footprint or
presence overseas, and the potential for environmental damage on
foreign soil. Section III discusses the specific findings of Arc
Ecology and addresses the Court's holdings. Section IV reviews
the current status of laws and policy that govern environmental
operating standards and cleanup for overseas bases. Section V
analyses the possible application of CERCLA principles in the
context of cleaning up former U.S. military bases overseas.
Specifically, this section reviews the appropriateness of requiring a
uniform, comprehensive environmental assessment [hereinafter
EA], public participation and liability under CERCLA. This
article concludes in section VI that while CERCLA's joint and
several liability scheme cannot function in the overseas context
without infringing on sovereign rights of both nation states in
negotiating a base's closure and cleanup, certain CERCLA
principles should be applied. Specifically, an EA, standard in
form and content for every base, should be required prior to
negotiating closure and cleanup. Such an assessment can and
should be used to encourage foreign and domestic public
participation when appropriate, prior governmental negotiation for
a base closure. Further, host nation law which does not impose
judicially imposed joint and several liability should apply to the
cleanup of U.S. military bases overseas. This proposal embodies
principles of diplomacy, and fairness and helps to put the U.S. in a
proper environmental leadership role without jeopardizing properly
placed principles of sovereignty and fair economics.
CERCLA
II. The U.S. Military's "Bootprint" Overseas
There are approximately 1,000 U.S. military bases or facilities
in foreign countries or territories. 6 This number has fluctuated
during the last sixty years since World War II when the number hit
a high of nearly 2,000. 7 Since that time, the numbers have surged
and declined during and after the Korean, Vietnam and Gulf
8Wars. More recently, the number of military bases overseas has
seen a dramatic increase since 9/11.9 Currently, the Department of
Defense has approximately 119,000 troops stationed in Europe,
37,000 in Korea and 45,000 in Japan. 1
0
The overall number of military bases or facilities the U.S.
maintains overseas does not always reflect the number of bases or
facilities which close as new bases and facilities open to take their
place. The military, for example, continues to contemplate closing
bases in Germany, and moving troops to countries such as
Hungary, Romania, Poland and Bulgaria to accommodate
changing mission requirements." Activity involving overseas
bases is not shrinking. Senator Kay Hutchinson stated that, "The
proposed overseas military construction budget for 2004 is over $1
billion. Over 70 percent is in Europe and Korea..." and that, "As
6 Royce Carlson, The Cost of Empire-U.S. Military Bases Overseas, at
www.zenzibar.com/news/article.asp?id=2988 (posted 7/7/2003) (last visited Jan.
3, 2005); Arc Ecology: Environment, Economy, Society and Peace, at
http://www.arcecology.org/International.shtml (n.d.).




10 Lawrence Morahan, Free Congress Foundation, US Plans for Military
Bases Reflect new Political Reality, quoting in part Senators Kay Bailey
Hutchinson (R-Texas) and Dianne Feinstein (D-Calif), at
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we approach a new round of [base] closures, overseas bases should
be scrutinized as closely as those stateside...
According to Arc Ecology, a non-governmental organization
(NGO) "...the United States military produces more hazardous
waste annually than the five largest international chemical
companies combined. [Arc Ecology refers to both the military's
domestic and overseas production of hazardous waste]. The
military controls more than 25 million acres of land (larger than
either the state of Tennessee or the Netherlands)..." 13 Arc Ecology
observes that, "Military bases can be like small industrial cities. In
addition to the gas stations, dry cleaners and storm water pollutants
that are typical of any city, military bases can host a wide variety
of heavy industrial activities from ship repair to ordnance
manufacture."' 14 Other major military activities impacting on the
environment include training with heavy destructive equipment
and explosives, maintenance on equipment, research and
development for enhanced war fighting capabilities, war games
and other exercises involving expansive and varied terrain, and
modem, destructive warfare. 15
With the number of U.S. military bases and facilities overseas,
as well as the wide reach of operations and activities conducted on
these installations, it does not stretch the imagination to conclude
that the U.S. military can have a significant impact on the
environment. While this article will address the environmental
legal controls applicable to the U.S. military in maintaining its
bases overseas, the focus of this article rests upon cleanup
obligations shared or shouldered by the host country and the U.S.
military at the onset of a base closure. The scope of military
operations and activities is important to consider as an indication
of the type and scope of cleanup issues the military faces upon the
closure of an overseas base.
12 Id.




III. Arc Ecology v. U.S. Dept. of the Air Force
In Arc Ecology, Filipino citizens who live and travel around the
land once occupied and operated by the U.S. as Air Force and
Navy bases - respectively, Clark A.F.B. and Subic Naval Base -
brought claims afainst the U.S. to assess the alleged pollution on
the former bases. 6 Individual citizens were joined by Arc Ecology
and the Filipino-American Coalition for Environmental Solutions,
both non-profit NGOs ("Plaintiffs").' 7 The Plaintiffs, requested,
pursuant to CERCLA, the court's order compelling the U.S.
Department of Air Force, the U.S. Department of Navy, the U.S.
Department of Defense and U.S. Defense Secretary, Donald
Rumsfeld, acting in his official capacity, ("Defendants") to
conduct preliminary assessments of the properties of the two
former U.S. military bases, and an order declaring that the
provisions of CERCLA apply. 18 In addition to their claims under
CERCLA, the plaintiffs also sought an order indicating that
Section 300.420(b)(5) of the National Contingency Plan
[hereinafter NCP] applied to the former U.S. bases in the
Philippines, and the same claim pursuant to the Administrative
Procedures Act [hereinafter APA], 5 U.S.C. 701 et seq.
19
The Defendants moved to dismiss the complaints on the
grounds that Plaintiff lacked standing, failed to state a claim on
which relief could be granted, and that the venue was not proper.
20
The Defendants asserted that CERCLA does not apply
extraterritorially.
2 1
16 Arc Ecology, 264 F.Supp.2d at 1153.
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The Arc Ecology Court first turned to the issue of standing.
22
The Court wrestled with this issue, specifically with the
determination whether the plaintiffs suffered actual injuries. The
Court stated that, "Whether Individually Named Plaintiffs have
standing in this case is a close call. ' 23 The Court, however,
ultimately found that the Plaintiffs had standing to bring their
CERCLA claim.24  Even though the Court's ultimate ruling
dismisses the Plaintiffs' claim, the Court's finding for standing
should not be taken for anything less than a significant victory to
the plaintiffs. The Court's ruling on standing indicates that at least
this Court is willing to keep the door ajar after Lujan v. National
25Wildlife Federation, wherein the Supreme Court granted
summary judgment, finding that plaintiffs did not have standing.
As Commander Michael Waters notes, "In overseas base closure
actions, plaintiffs may have a difficult time testing DOD closure
decisions in the wake of the Lujon precedents and the current
'right' leaning of the Supreme Court."2r
What the Court gives to the plaintiffs on the standing issue, it
takes away in its ruling on substantive matters by granting the
Defendants' motion to dismiss.27 The Court first addressed the
purpose of CERCLA, 28 then the heart of the Plaintiffs'
complaint. 29 Finally, the Court concludes that CERCLA does not
apply extraterritorially.
30
The Court notes that, "Enacted in 1980, CERCLA was
designed to 'Provide for liability, compensation, cleanup, and
emergency response for hazardous substances released into the
22 Id.
23 Id. at 1155.
24 Id.
25 497 U.S. 871, 110 S.Ct 3177, 111 L.Ed.2d 695 (1990).
26 CDR Michael Allan Waters, JAGC, U.S.Navy, Closure of U.S. Military
Bases Overseas: International-Environmental Law Implications (Fall 1998)
(unpublished L.L.M. dissertation) (on file with author).
27 Arc Ecology, 294 F.Supp.2d at 1160.
28 Id. at 1156.
29 Id. at 1154.
30 Id. at 1156-59.
environment and the cleanup of inactive hazardous waste disposal
sites.' Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980)." 31 Turning to the
legislative history, the Court found that CERCLA "reflects a
decidedly domestic focus."
32
The Court addressed the thrust of the Plaintiff's complaint:
The provision that addresses the primary
relief sought in the Complaint-CERCLA §
105(d), 42 U.S.C. § 9605(d)-provides that,
in certain circumstances, a person who is or
may be affected by a release or threatened
release of a hazardous substance, pollutant
or contaminant may "petition" the President
to conduct a preliminary assessment of any
associated hazards to the public health and
the environment. Section 105(d) is
implemented by a provision in the National
Contingency Plan, 40 C.F.R. § 300.420,
under which a person may petition for a
preliminary assessment when the person is
or may be affected by a release of a
hazardous substance, pollutant, or
contaminant. Petitions involving federal
facilities are addressed to the head of the
appropriate federal agency and describe the
release and how it affects the petitioner.
Petitions must contain information about
activities where the release is located and
explain whether "local and state authorities"
have been contacted.33
The Arc Ecology Court ultimately and appropriately rested its
ruling upon a U.S. Supreme Court's holding "that it is a
31 Id. at 1156.
32 id.
33 Id. at 1157.
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'longstanding principle of American law' that 'legislation of
Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only
within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States."' The
Court further held that, "Courts must assume that Congress
legislates against the backdrop of an underlying presumption
against extraterritoriality and therefore must presume that a statute
applies only within the United States unless it contains 'the
affirmative intention of the Congress clearly expressed' that it
applies abroad. 35 Beyond legislative history, The Court found
ample "plain language" in CERCLA to conclude that the statute
does not apply extraterritorially to "cover properties located within
another sovereign nation."
36
Arc Ecology is consistent with other court holdings limiting the
extension of domestically based legislation in an overseas
context. 37 Environmental Defense Fund v. Massey38 still provides
the broadest extraterritorial application of domestic law. But even
Massey did not stray too far. Massey held that the National
Environmental Policy Act [hereinafter NEPA] could apply in
sovereign-less Antarctica where policy decisions to use an
incinerator at a scientific research center were made within the
U.S.
3 9
Although there is a strong presumption against applying
legislation extraterritorially. The Massey Court points out that the
presumption can be overcome "where there is an 'affirmative
intention of the Congress clearly expressed' to extend the scope of
the statute to conduct occurring within other sovereign nations."
40
34 Id. at 1157, citing EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248,
111 S.Ct. 1227, 113 L.Ed.2d. 274 (1991) [hereinafter Aramco] (quoting Foley
Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285, 69 S.Ct. 575, 93 L.Ed. 680 (1949)).
35 Id. at 1157-58, citing Aramco, 499 U.S. at 248 (quoting Benz v. Compania
Naviera Hidalgo, S.A., 353 U.S. 138, 147, 77 S.Ct 699, 1 L.Ed.2d 709 (1957)).
36 Id. at 1159.
37 See generally Aramco, supra note 34.
38 986 F.2d 528 (1993).
39 Id.
40 Id. at 531 citing Aramco, 499 U.S. at 248 (in turn quoting Benz v.
Compania Naviera Hidalgo, S.A., 353 U.S. 138, (1957). See also James E.
In other words, it is clear that Congress can, if it chooses, extend
its authority overseas. It clearly has authority to reach beyond the
territory of the U.S. 4 1 This reach, however, should also be
tempered with the international law presumption against
extraterritorial application of domestic laws. 2 While Arc Ecology
is solidly grounded, shutting out the extraterritorial application of
CERCLA, it remains silent as to whether Congress should act to
make CERCLA, or CERCLA principles, law for cleaning up U.S.
military bases overseas in spite of presumptions to the contrary.
Or, in the alternative, should the President act by executive order
to apply such principles?
IV. Current Law and Policy Governing the Cleanup of U.S.
Military Overseas Bases
A. Congressional Legislation
The application of Congressional legislation is limited
overseas, mainly for the reasons discussed above. There are,
however, congressionally made laws which reach overseas military
bases by the general application to Department of Defense
[hereinafter DoD] activities.43 One example, cited by Lieutenant
Colonel Richard Phelps, is asbestos abatement requirements
mandated by the Asbestos School Hazard Abatement Act of 1984.
These requirements apply to "any school of any agency of the
United States," to include DoD Dependant Schools overseas. 44
Landis, JAGC, USN, The Domestic Implications of Environmental Stewardship
at Overseas Installations: A Look at Domestic Questions Raised by the United
States Overseas Environmental Policies, 49 Naval L. Rev. 99, 114 (2002).
41 See generally Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285, 69 S.Ct. 575, 577,
93 L.Ed. 680 (1942); American Banana Company v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S.
347, 29 S.Ct. 511, 53 L.Ed. 826 (1909); Waters, supra note 26, at 55.
42 See infra note 85 ("States have.., the sovereign right to exploit their own
resources pursuant to their own environmental and developmental policies...").
43 Lieutenant Colonel Richard A. Phelps, USAF, Environmental Law for
Overseas Installations, 40 A.F. L. REv. 49, 49 (1996).
44 Id. at 50.
CERCLA20041
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However, statutory laws in the category of "general
extraterritorial applicability" are "exceptional. Congress simply
does not enact many laws with stated extraterritorial application,46
mainly for the reason that this exercise of power would encroach
upon the President's warfighting role and capacity.47 This does not
mean, though, that the U.S. military operates freely without the
rule of law when it comes to environmental protection overseas.
B. Executive Orders, DoD Policy and Guidelines
Mostly as a reflection of the separation of powers,
48
environmental protection at federal facilities is governed by
Presidential Executive Orders [hereinafter E.O.]. In 1978,
President Jimmy Carter signed E.O. 12088, the first E.O. to
address environmental protection at U.S. facilities overseas.50 E.O.
12088 requires the head of executive agencies responsible for the
construction and operation of federal facilities outside of the U.S.
to ensure the facilities' construction and operation complies with
"standards of general applicability in the host country or
jurisdiction." 51 President Carter later signed E.O. 12114, entitled
Environmental Effects Abroad of Major Federal Actions, which
had the effect of creating a NEPA-like requirement for
Environmental Impact Analysis requirements for certain categories
of "major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the
45 Id.
46 DAVID HUNTER Er AL., INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY
1436 (Foundation Press 2d ed. 2002).
47 See generally Landis, supra note 40, at 123-24. For a counter point of view
see generally, Mitchell F. Crusto, All that Glitters is not Gold: A
Congressionally-Driven Global Environmental Policy, 11 GEO. INT'L. L. REV.
499, 528 (1999) (Crusto argues that congress has failed to "act proactively on
Vlobal environmental issues").
8 Landis, supra note 40, at 125-26.
49 See generally Phelps, supra note 43, at 52.
50 Id.
51 Exec. Order No. 12,088, § 1-801, 43 Fed. Reg. 47, 707 (Oct. 13, 1978); see
also Phelps, supra note 43, at 53.
human environment...,,52 outside the geographical borders of the
United States, its territories and possessions. 53  This executive
order was implemented in 1979 by DoD Directive 6050.7. 54 Later
versions of this directive, lead to the development of the Overseas
Environmental Baseline Guidance Document [hereinafter
OEBGD]. This document essentially allows the Secretary of
Defense to develop an overseas compliance policy.
55
DoD policy evolved into the more recent DoD Directive
6050.16 and was later replaced by DoD Instruction 4715.5,
Management of Environmental Compliance at Overseas
Installations, in 1996. As James Landis explains, "In essence,
these policy mandates require the overseas installations in each
foreign country to compare the OEBGD with local environmental
standards of general applicability in determining the appropriate
standards for the U.S. military bases in that country." 56 The result
is the Final Governing Standards [hereinafter FGSs], which
combines and blends the most restrictive requirements of the
OEBGD, host national laws of general applicability, and applicable
international agreements with the host country.57 The FGS is the
yardstick the military ultimately uses to measure its environmental
protection compliance for its operations on overseas installations.
The OEBGD was more recently rewritten and issued in March,
582000. Landis comments on this baseline guidance document,
"lest anyone think that little time or effort has gone into compiling
and assessing the applicability of U.S. environmental law, the
OEBGD is 230 pages long, covering 22 ostensibly military
references which in turn incorporate virtually every U.S.
52 42 U.S.C.A § 4332(2)(c) (2004).
53 Exec. Order. No. 12, 114, § 1, 3 C.F.R. 356 (1979) reprinted in 42 U.S.C. §
4321 (2004); see also Phelps, supra note 43, at 53.
54 DoD Directive 6050.7, Environmental Effects Abroad of Major Department
of Defense Actions, (Mar. 31, 1979).
55 Landis, supra note 40, at 117.
56 Id. at 117-18.
57 DoD Instructions No. 4715.5, § 4.1 and §§ 6.3.3.1 and 6.3.3.2 (Apr. 22,
1996).
58 Landis, supra note 40, at 118.
2004] CERCLA
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environmental regulation."59  Despite some diluting of the
principles of the Endangered Species Act [hereinafter ESA],6° the
list of environmental standards, requirements and procedures for
the operation of military bases overseas is fairly comprehensive.
61
However, strict guidance and requirements for overseas base
environmental cleanup is conspicuously absent from any DoD
guidance documents or policy. DoD's current policy for base
closures requires mandatory cleanup of environmental
contamination for two circumstances: 1) if contamination posed a
"known imminent and substantial danger to human health and
safety", and 2) if cleanup is necessary to "sustain current
operations." 62 Other than for reasons to comply with these two
standards, it is DoD policy not to expend funds for environmental
remediation when a base is being returned to the host country.
63
Further, according to Phelps, "...policy drafters were purposefully
ambiguous in not defining the phrase 'known imminent and
substantial endangerment to human health and safety' to allow
decision makers maximum flexibility.' 64 Essentially, the FGS will
"not apply to remedial or cleanup actions to correct environmental
problems caused by the DoD's past activities." 65 The U.S. does
not bind itself to local domestic laws, absent express agreement.
Cleanup of contamination for past activities is performed only
"in accordance with applicable international agreements, Status of
Forces Agreements, and U.S. government policy." 66 Without an
59 Id.
60 Id.
61 Department of Defense, Overseas Environmental Baseline Guidance
Document [hereinafter OEBGD], DoD 4715.5-G (Mar. 2000). See also
http://www.denix.osd.mil.
62 Message of the Secretary of Defense, SECDEF MSG 142159Z DEC 93,
DoD Policy and Procedures for the Realignment of Overseas Sites. See also
Memorandum from Deputy Secretary of Defense John P. White, Environmental
Remediation Policy for DoD Activities Overseas (18 Oct 1995). See generally
Phelps, supra note 43, at 77.
63 Id. See also Secretary of Defense Message 131758Z Jan 92 (Jan. 13, 1992).
64 Phelps, supra note 43, at 79.
65 OEBGD, supra note 61, at 1-1.
66 Id. at 1-1.
international agreement or outside domestic or international
political pressure, the military is not bound to any remediation
obligation. Phelps comments:
Since the cleanup is conducted in
cooperation with local authorities, that risk-
based cleanup level would necessarily be
determined in coordination with those
authorities. However, absent some other
international legal obligation or political
imperative when local authorities demand a
more protective level of cleanup than we
believe is needed to adequately protect
health and welfare, we are under no
obligation to comply.
67
U.S. policy requires defense agencies to gather and maintain
existing information and allows them to gather additional
information regarding environmental contamination at DoD bases.
This information is delivered to the host nation upon request when
the base is turned over.6 8 However, there is no consistency or
specific requirement to gather more than existing information.
C. Status of Forces Agreements
The bedrock international agreement pertaining to U.S.
military overseas bases is the Status of Forces Agreement
[hereinafter SOFA]. The SOFA addresses issues such as the right
of primary criminal jurisdiction over U.S. members of the force,
claims, force protection and the use of deadly force, entry and exit
requirements, customs and taxes, contracts, vehicle licensing and
67 Phelps, supra note 43, at 77.
68 Id. at 81, citing Memorandum from Deputy Secretary of Defense John P.
White, Environmental Remediation Policy for DoD Activities Overseas (18 Oct
1995) at paras. 2.fa.(2), 2.b.(2), 2.c.(2), and 3.
2004] CERCLA
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registration, and communication support. 69  The SOFA is often
bilateral, but can also be multilateral, as in the case of the NATO
SOFA drafted for all NATO countries after World War 11.70 In the
case of multilateral agreements, supplements are often added to
address particular concerns of a country. Some SOFAs are
classified.7'
If environmental remediation of a U.S. base overseas were to
be addressed in an international agreement, it would most
appropriately be addressed in a SOFA. However, environmental
concerns and any reference to what might be made into an
environmental cleanup requirement are absent in most SOFAs.
72
This is largely the result of how long ago the agreements were
made in relation to the more recent and increased awareness of the
environment in general. As Waters observes, "Most military bases
were built before 'environment' was a household word..."
The majority of SOFAs, such as the NATO SOFA, only
contain general references to the sending State (the state sending
the armed forces to a host country) respecting the laws of the
receiving State (the host country). 74 A unique exception is the 1993
German supplementary agreement.75 With some limitations, this
agreement requires sending State forces to apply German law in
their use of an installation or facility during the operation of the
69 See CTR. FOR MILITARY LAW AND OPERATIONS AND INT'L LAW DIV., THE
JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL'S SCHOOL, U.S. ARMY, OPERATIONAL LAW
HANDBOOK 12-11 (JA 422 1998) [hereinafter OLH].
70 Dean Churchill Rodgers, Closing Overseas Military Installations:
Environmental Issues, International Agreements and Department of Defense
Policy (1991) (unpublished thesis, National Law Center of the George
Washington University) (on file with author); Waters, supra note 26, at 19.
71 OLH, supra note 69, at 12-4; see also Waters, supra note 26, at 19.
72 Waters, supra note 26, at 18; Phelps, supra note 43, at 58; Rodgers, supra
note 70 at 26.
73 Waters, supra note 26, at note 1.
74 Phelps, supra note 43, at 58; Rogers, supra note 70 at 18-20.
75 Agreement to Supplement the Agreement Between the Parties to the North
Atlantic Treaty Regarding the Status of their Forces with Respect to Foreign
Forces Stationed in the Federal Republic of Germany, 18 Mar. 1993 ("German
Supplementary Agreement").
installation or facility. 76 Even more relevant to this article, the
German supplementary agreement requires the sending State to
bear the costs of assessing, evaluating, and remediating
environmental contamination which it caused.77 However, as
stated above, the German Supplementary Agreement is an
exception. The majority of SOFAs are silent to any obligation to
remediate environmental damage. 7 8 Such silence puts the sending
and receiving States at opposite ends of the bargaining table when
they negotiate a base closure. The results often depend upon,
"practically speaking, who will blink first." 79
V. Applying CERCLA Principles to the Cleanup of Overseas
Military Bases
A. A Double Standard?
The U.S. has been sharply criticized for clinging to a double
standard when it comes to cleaning up its former military bases
overseas. Generally, the view shared by its critics is that the U.S.
does not "treat hazards created by the U.S. military outside of the
76 This obligation requires cooperation with the German government for
seeking permits and the use of low-pollutant fuels and compliance emissions,
and in the transportation of hazardous materials. See Phelps, supra note 43, at
58-59.
77 These requirements can be satisfied through SOFA claims, residual value
off-sets, or directly, subject to "the availability of funds and the fiscal
procedures of the Government of the sending State." See generally Phelps,
supra note 43, at 59.
78 Phelps, supra note 43, at 82.
79 Waters, supra note 26, at 6.
80 Kim David Chanbonpin, Holding the United States Accountable for
Environmental Damages Caused by the U.S. Military in the Philippines, a Plan
for the Future, 4 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL'Y J. 245, 249 (2003); Commander
Margaret M. Carlson, JAGC, USN, Environmental Diplomacy: Analyzing Why
the U.S. Navy Still Falls Short Overseas, 47 NAVAL L. REV. 62, 70 (2000); M.
Victoria Bayoneto, The Former U.S. Bases in the Philippines: An Argument for
the Application of U.S. Environmental Standards to Overseas Military Bases, 6
FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 111, 155 (1994).
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country with the same degree of seriousness that it has accorded
defense sites within its territorial borders." 81 Whether or not this is
true, there is perhaps some truth to the adage that perception is
reality. Perhaps it makes sense to look at the end result of
contamination remaining on closed domestic U.S. bases and
compare it, factually, to closed bases located overseas. 82 Perhaps
there is value in taking notice that laws applied domestically within
the U.S. are different from the laws applied to overseas military
bases. 83 But these presumptions are starting points. Generalized
observations that the U.S. is acting differently overseas than it does
domestically does not sufficiently address whether the U.S. is
neglecting its responsibility to the host nation, its citizens or to the
global community. Generalized criticism glosses over particular
methods or practices that the U.S. can realistically employ to
improve its cleanup efforts on overseas military bases.
Applying CERCLA principles, whole-cloth, to the cleanup of
overseas military bases is an overly simplistic approach to
improving environmental conditions on U.S. military bases
overseas. A better approach is dissecting CERCLA into basic
components to find which of its underlying principles can be
appropriately applied or transplanted into the overseas context.
There are at least three basic phases of CERCLA cleanup relevant
to this article: 1) assessing contamination through an
81 Chanbonpin, supra note 80, at 274.
82 Id. at 267, Chanbonpin argues, "when the U.S. troops left the Philippines in
the early 1990s, the DoD relinquished all responsibility for the huge
environmental task that remained as a result of its presence at Subic and Clark.
The U.S. military dumped millions of gallons of sewage on the ground and in its
water, and chemicals have seeped into the soil and water table. The U.S.
General Accounting Office (GAO) estimated the clean-up would cost more the
$12-15 million per site." However, Chanbonpin also notes at 268, "... there is a
marked difference in the way the U.S. government has chosen to deal with its
cleanup duties in the Philippines compared to the duties it has voluntarily
shouldered in developed countries, such as Germany."
83 Id. at 274-75, Chanbonpin generally observes, "Although DoD operations
within the fifty states, the District of Columbia, and each of the fourteen U.S.
territories and possessions are subject to the strict regulation of federal
environmental laws, its overseas installations are not."
environmental assessment; 2) public participation regarding the
plan for remediation; and 3) assessing liability for the cleanup cost.
The phase where contamination initially occurs is primarily
addressed by the Solid Waste Disposal Act, as amended by the
Resource Recovery and Conservation Act [hereinafter RCRA], 42
USCA 6901, et seq. domestically, and by executive order and by
DoD policy, as discussed above. This initial phase is largely
beyond the scope of the remainder of this article.
This section will address general international law principles
that help shape the U.S. military's environmental responsibilities
overseas, and the benefits the U.S. gains as an environmental
leader in the international community. More importantly, this
section addresses how these principles and benefits interrelate to
specific CERCLA principles.
B. International Law and Diplomacy
The United Nations' Stockholm Declaration [hereinafter
Stockholm] of 197284 and Rio Declaration on Environment and
Development [hereinafter Rio] of 199285 lay a primary
groundwork for assessing global cooperation and environmental
responsibility among sovereign States.86 Although the principles.
outlined in these declarations are not of themselves binding,87 their
increased use in international arenas has launched many of their
84 See Report of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment at
Stockholm, Jun. 16, 1972, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/14 (1972), reprinted in 11
I.L.M. 1416 (1972) [hereinafter Stockholm Declaration].
85 See Report of the United Nations Conference on Environment and
Development at Rio de Janeiro, Jun. 13, 1992, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 151/5/Rev. 1
(1992), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 876 [hereinafter Rio Declaration] (containing the
declaration and its principles). But see A/CONF. 151/26/Rev. 1 (Vol. I-IV) for a
copy of the declaration, its principles, and the conference proceedings
[hereinafter Complete Proceedings of the Rio Conference].
86 See generally HUNTER ET. AL, supra note 46, at 173, 176 citing Louis B.
Sohn, The Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment, 14 HARV. INT'L
L.J. 423,431-33 (1973).
87 Id. at 196.
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principles into the emergence of customary law.88 It would be
disingenuous for the U.S., as a signatory, to simply dismiss or
ignore the principles contained in the declarations. The U.S.
Restatement (Third) of the Law of Foreign Relations §601(1)(a)
acknowledges a State's obligation to "conform to generally
accepted international rules and standards for the prevention,
reduction, and control of injury to the environment of another state
or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction...,89 Further,
the United Nations [hereinafter U.N.] Charter, Article 1.3, includes
within the purposes of the U.N. "to achieve international
cooperation in solving international problems of an economic,
social, cultural, or humanitarian character..." 90
Central to the Rio Declaration is the tug-of-war dichotomy
between the developed and lesser developed countries. 91 Principle
7 of the Rio Declaration, places greater responsibility on developed
nations to achieve sustainable development:
States shall cooperate in a spirit of global
partnership to conserve, protect and restore
the health and integrity of the Earth's
ecosystem. In view of the different
contributions to the global environmental
degradation, States have common but
differentiated responsibilities. The
developed countries acknowledge the
responsibility that they bear in the
international pursuit of sustainable
development in view of the pressures their
societies place on the global environment
and of the technologies and financial
88 Waters, supra note 26, at 32.
89 See generally HUNTER ET AL., supra note 46, at 425.
9 Id. at 428.
9' Id. at 186-204.
resources they command. (emphasis
added).
92
The U.S. was careful not to allow broad-brush interpretations
of Principle 7, but acknowledged its role as an environmental
world leader. When signing on to the Rio Declaration, the U.S.
attached its interpretation to this principle:
The United States understands and accepts
that principle 7 highlights the special
leadership role of the developed countries,
based on our industrial development, our
experiences with environmental protection
policies and actions, and our wealth,
technical expertise and capacities.
The United States does not accept any
interpretation of principle 7 that would
imply a recognition or acceptance by the
United States of any international
obligations or liabilities, or any diminution
in the responsibilities of developing
countries.
9 3
The U.S. military best accomplishes its missions when it can
win over the hearts and minds of the foreign citizens in the
countries with which they interact. 94 Focused on this purpose and
the continued desire to spread democracy, the U.S. military
engages in military-to-military liaisons95 in foreign countries and
92 Rio Declaration, supra note 85, at 877.
93 Complete Proceedings of the Rio Conference, supra note 85, at 17.
94 See generally, Winning the Hearts and Minds (November 24, 2003),
Foresight Intelligence Summary, available at
http://www.realforesight.com/INTELSUM.HTML (last visited Jan. 3, 2005).
95 See generally, Mil-to-Mil:. Assessing U.S. National Security Cooperation
Strategies, a conference invitation to the Boston University (17 October 2002) at
http://www.bu.edu/ir/milintro.html; COL David M. Glantz, U.S. Army and Mr.
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embraces projects in the furtherance of the DoD's Humanitarian
and Civic Assistance [hereinafter HCA] program. 96  Under the
design of this program, the U.S. military "engages in relief and
development-type projects in developing countries in conjunction
with the armies of host nations. Such projects include the
construction of roads, wells, and schools, as well as the provision
of medical, dental, and veterinary services. 97 Military attaches are
also assigned to embassies to assist in information exchange and to
preserve the image of the U.S. military in foreign countries.
98
In winning over the hearts and minds of foreign citizens, the
U.S. military can play a leading role in environmental leadership
overseas. Coining the phrase, "environmental diplomacy" 99 within
the military context, Commander Margaret Carlson comments,
"Although, members of the US Armed Forces have always been
diplomats of a sort, trying to leave a good impression in every port
visited, never did the task require so much intricacy and finesse as
the current international environmental obligations." DoD
proclaimed a leadership role in environmental compliance and
protection.100 It seems appropriate that the U.S. military, as an arm
of the sovereignty, should aspire to a higher level of environmental
protection, than, say, corporate America. The U.S. government
Lester W. Grau, The State of Military to Military Intellectual Cooperative
Programs (August 1996), available at
http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/fmsopubs/issues/minskpap.htm; and, U.S.
Foreign Military Assistance, Database on U.S. Security Assistance FY 1990-
2003, at http://www.fas.org/asmp/profiles/aid/aidindex.htm
96 U.S. Military Civic Action Programs and Democratization in Central
America; From The Democracy Backgrounder, A Publication of the
Interhemispheric Resource Center, Vol. 1, no. 3. 6 September, 1995. at
http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archieves/47/004.html; see also, Frida Berrigan,
U.S. Military Training: Exporting Democracy? (November 2000), available at
http://www.afsc.org/pwok/I 100/1 12k08.htm
97 Id.
98 See generally: Col David Potts, USAF, The Rise of Military Diplomacy:
New Roles for the Defense Attache', at
http://www.faoa.org/journal/pottsx00.html
99 Carlson, supra note 80, at 63.
100 Phelps, supra note 43, at 88.
should at least set the pace. While Carlson claims there is "room
for improvement" in the U.S. military's environmental policies
overseas, 01 the question remains as to how far should the U.S. go
in extending U.S. environmental domestic law and policy to its
overseas bases.
C. The Human Right to a Healthy Environment:
Environmental Assessments, Public Participation and the
Right-to-Know
As a general proposition, environmental assessments
[hereinafter EA's], participation in the cleanup process by affected
citizens, and the public's right-to-know [hereinafter RTK] are
interrelated and fundamental to environmental management and
cleanup. It is simply difficult for the public to knowingly
participate in the cleanup process if uniform assessments of
environmental contamination are not performed and made
available.
This concept is embraced by Principle 10 of the Rio Declaration:
Environmental issues are best handled with
the participation of all concerned citizens, at
the relevant level. At the national level,
each individual shall have appropriate
access to information concerning the
environment that is held by public
authorities, including information on
hazardous materials and activities in their
communities, and the opportunity to
participate in decision-making processes.
States shall facilitate and encourage public
awareness and participation by making
information widely available. Effective
101 OEBGD, supra note 97, at 61.
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access to judicial and administrative
proceedings, including redress and remedy,
shall be provided.1
0 2
In addition to Principle 10, Principle 1 of the Rio Declaration
states that human beings "are entitled to a healthy and productive
life in harmony with nature." 10 3 The human right to a healthy
environment appears to be emerging as a customary law. In
addition to the principles found in the Rio Declaration, the African
and Inter-American human rights charters have adopted the human
right to a healthy environment. 1°4 More sophisticated in scope and
enforcement, the European Human Rights Court [hereinafter
EHRC] has interpreted the right to privacy as embracing the right
to a healthy environment. 1°5  In Lopez-Ostra v. Spain,'06 for
example, the EHRC held in favor of an applicant and her daughter
for health problems caused by the operations of a tannery waste
treatment plant located near their home. The court found that the
environmental harm violated their right to a private and family
102 Stockholm Declaration, supra note 84.
103 Rio Declaration, supra note 85.
104 See African Charter on Human and People's Rights 21 I.L.M. 58, 63 (1981)
[hereinafter African Charter]. Article 21 of the African Charter grants that "[a]ll
peoples shall have the right to a general satisfactory environment favorable to
their development"; see Additional Protocol to the American Convention on
Human Rights (San Salvador Protocol); HUNTER ET. AL., supra note 46, at
1298. Article 11(1) holds that, "[e]veryone shall have the right to live in a
healthy environment..."
105 HUNTER ET. AL., supra note 46, at 1301. See also Dinah Shelton, Human
Rights and the Environment: Jurisprudence of Human Rights Bodies, at
http://www.cedha.org.ar/docs/doc63.htm (last visited on Mar. 12, 2004). This
paper was presented at the Joint UNEP-OHCHR Expert Seminar on Human
Rights and the Environment in Geneva from January 14-16, 2002. Article 8(1)
of the European Convention on Human Rights provides that everyone has "[t]he
right to respect for family and private life... [and the right] to peaceful
enjoyment of possessions." See generally International Centre for Commercial
Law & The Legal 500, Human Rights and the Environment 16 (1999), at
http://www.legal500.com/devs/uk/ev/ukev_040.htm.
106 App. No. 16798/90, 20 Eur. H.R. Rep. 277 (1994).
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life.' °7  The EHRC later reconfirmed Lopez-Ostra in Guerra &
Others v. Italy,108 holding for applicant citizens in Manfredonia,
Italy who complained of pollution resulting form the operation of a
chemical factory. 1
09
Beyond the Rio Declaration and regional human rights
systems, several national and constitutional laws have emerged to
recognize the right to a healthy environment."10 The Supreme
Court of Costa Rica, for example, affirmed the right to life and a
healthy environment after a plaintiff complained when his
government allowed a cliff in his neighborhood to be used as a
dump."' The Philippine Supreme Court upheld the constitutional
right to a balanced and healthful ecology under their national Bill
of Rights after plaintiffs sued to have logging licenses revoked as a
result of excessive deforestation.1
12
With the blend and proliferation of international principles,
regional human rights and national laws focusing on the
environment, the human right to a healthy environment is gaining
solid footing as customary international law. It is a right that the
U.S. military will likely need to address with greater energy in the
future.
The RTK is a companion to the human right to a healthy
environment. In 2003, environmental and human rights groups
joined efforts in a publication addressing the need for international
RTK.11 3 Although this report focuses primarily on the need for
107 Id.
10' App. No. 14967/89, 26 Eur. H.R. Rep. 357 (1998).
109 Id.
110 See generally Carl Bruch et al, Constitutional Environmental Law: Giving
Force to Fundamental Principles in Africa, 26 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 131, 143
(2001).
1 International Human Rights internship Program & Forum Asia, Circle of
Rights-Economic, Social & Cultural Rights Activism: A Training Resource Pt.
I§V, Module 15, 8 (on file with author).
112 Id. 8, at 42.
113 See AFL-CIO, Amnesty International USA, EarthRights International,
Friends of the Earth, Global Exchange, Oxfam America, Sierra club & Working
Group on Community' Right to Know, International Right to Know:
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corporate transparency by U.S. companies operating overseas, it
also encourages all nations to enact its own RTK laws. It urges,
"[e]ventually, we hope that each country will pass its own right-to-
know laws. Organizations such as the European Union and the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development have
already urged their member countries to do so.' ' 14 The movement
toward empowering average citizens with information is on the
march. The RTK also seems fundamental and consistent with
continued U.S. efforts to spread democracy.
As discussed above, the petitioners in Arc Ecology sought a
preliminary assessment of the hazards to public health under
CERCLA §105 (d), 42 U.S.C. 9605(d). 115  However, as also
discussed above, the court found no extraterritorial extension of
CERCLA, 116 and since no existing executive order or policy
requires the military to perform an EA, the military is under no
obligation to comply with the plaintiffs' demand."l 7 This article
urges that a comprehensive and uniform EA1t8 be required by
executive order prior to the closure of every U.S. military base
overseas, and that the assessment be made publicly available to the
extent that it does not compromise classified information or
legitimate U.S. security interests. An EA of this nature should take
into account alternative levels of cleanup, and possible uses of the
base's land.
Public participation prior to remediation is required under
CERCLA §117(a); 42 U.S.C. 9617(a). This right, enjoyed by U.S.
citizens for domestic cleanups, includes the "...opportunity for
submission of written and oral comments and an opportunity for a
Empowering Communities Through Corporate Transparency (Jan. 2003), at
http://www.foe.org/camps/intl/corpacct/irtk.pdf (last visited Dec. 4, 2005).
114 Id. at 22.
115 Arc Ecology, 294 F.Supp.2d at 1157.
116 Id. at 1157-58.
117 Phelps, supra note 43, at 77.
18 The use of the acronym "EA" for "environmental assessment" should not be
confused with "EA" representing the phrase "environmental executive agent"
provided for in DoD Directive 6050.16, paras. C.2. and D.l.b.
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consideration include: foreign relations
sensitivities; whether the hearings would be
an infringement or create the appearance of
infringement on the sovereign
responsibilities of another government;
requirements of domestic and foreign
governmental confidentiality; requirements
of national security; whether meaningful
information could be obtained through
hearings; time considerations; and
requirements for commercial
confidentiality. 22
Without a comprehensive, uniform EA of the contamination,
meaningful public participation cannot occur. Treatment of one
base in one country will be, or will at least appear to be,
inconsistent. 123 While the actual cost born by the U.S. may differ
from one base to another, as will be discussed in the next
subsection, the playing field will be level from the onset of
negotiations if a uniform, comprehensive EA is first performed.
While the cost of uniform EAs can be costly to U.S. taxpayers, it
should be considered part of the cost of doing business overseas
and the military budget should be supplemented to accommodate
for this requirement.
The Government Accounting Office [hereinafter GAO],
serving as a type of landlord for the military, argues against the
extraterritorial application of NEPA requirements for
Environmental Impact Statements [hereinafter EIS]. 124  The
arguments can also be applied to CERCLA. The GAO argues
that extraterritorial application of an Environmental Impact
Statement will infringe on sovereignty, increase lawsuits, disrupt
U.S. relations with other countries, limit the President's ability to
act in foreign affairs, be cost prohibitive, and that public
122 DoD Directive 6050.7, § E1.4.7 (1979).
123 Chanbonpin, supra note 80.
124 Carlson, supra note 80, at 90-9 1.
participation in other countries would be politically and
culturally difficult to accomplish due to translating documents.' 
25
Carlson's counter-arguments, though more relevant to NEPA
than to CERCLA, are noteworthy. She states:
These arguments against extraterritorial
application of NEPA do not explain why
U.S. assessment standards could not be used
for U.S. overseas military activities that do
not include the host-nation. The argument
for extraterritorial application is that NEPA
procedures would foster better decisions
with regard to the environment. Surely,
NEPA requirements would not infringe on
sovereignty of the host-nation if the federal
action was exclusive to U.S. personnel and
operations. 126
Carlson's response must be viewed in light of the differences
between NEPA and CERCLA. While a NEPA or a NEPA-like
EIS addresses major actions being undertaken by the federal
government, 127 CERCLA looks to cleanup. In the overseas
context, this means that a federal activity is ending and that the
base is being fully handed over to the host country. By the very
nature of the event, it is rare that the host country is not involved in
the negotiations to make this happen. With such interaction, there
is a greater likelihood that the laws and policy of the two nations
will conflict. 128  However, if the U.S. remains focused on
performing an EA for contamination cleanup, without unilaterally
imposing subsequent requirements, there should be little threat to
the concerns expressed by the GAO.
125 Id. at 91.
126 Id.
127 42 U.S.C.A § 4332(2)(c) (2004).
128 Waters, supra note 26, at 42.
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A comprehensive, uniform EA will advance the cause of
consistency among closing overseas bases and help level the
playing field at the negotiating table between two sovereign
nations. Citizens of the host nation will be appropriately
empowered with knowledge of the extent of contamination on the
closing base and can petition their government for an appropriate
response during the negotiations. This article does not suggest that
citizens or NGOs become involved in the actual negotiations
between the two sovereign States, but that they become fully
informed and given a chance to communicate with their respective
States prior to the negotiations. A uniform, comprehensive EA
will not inappropriately tie the hands of the U.S. military in
negotiating an overseas base closure. As discussed below, the EA
will not be the only factor in the ultimate cleanup of the overseas
base and the results of negotiations will vary.
D. CERCLA in Circles; Sovereign States as Potentially
Responsible Parties
Although a uniform, comprehensive EA sets the appropriate
backdrop for closure and cleanup negotiations of U.S. military
bases overseas, it cannot, nor should it drive the end result of cost
allocation. As will be discussed below within this subsection,
those demanding greater U.S. cleanup liability often miss the
significance and involvement of the host country during the
operations of the U.S. base. They also often overlook the benefits
a host nation receives during the base's operations and after its
closure.
During the closure negotiations of U.S. military bases overseas,
some host countries have argued that Principle 21 of the
Stockholm Declaration applies to their environmental cleanup.'
29
129 Id. at 29.
This principle, similar to Principle 2 of the Rio Declaration,
130
provides:
States have, in accordance with the Charter
of the United Nations and the principles of
international law, the sovereign right to
exploit their own resources pursuant to their
own environmental policies, and the
responsibility to ensure that activities within
their own jurisdiction or control do not
cause damage to the environment of other
States or areas beyond the limits of national
jurisdiction. (emphasis added).' 31
Additionally, some critics of the U.S. military's environmental
practices overseas, refer to Principle 16 of the Rio Declaration
supporting the "polluter pays" principle: 1
32
National authorities should endeavor to
promote the internalization of environmental
costs and the use of economic instruments,
taking into account the approach that the
polluter should in principle, bear the cost of
pollution, with due regard to the public
interest and without distorting international
trade and investment.
133
In support of the "polluter pays" argument, critics refer to the
'341941 Trail Smelter Arbitration [hereinafter Trail Smelter],
130 See Principle 2, Rio Declaration, supra note 85, at 876 (includes the
"sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own
environmental and developmental policies..." [emphasis added]).
131 Stockholm Declaration, supra note 84, at 1420.
132 Rio Declaration, supra note 85, at 879.
133 id.
134 Chanbonpin, supra note 80, at 281-83, citing Trail Smelter Case (U.S. v.
Can.), 3 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 1905 (1938 & 1941) [hereinafter Trail Smelter
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between the U.S. and Canada. In that case, the U.S. argued that
Canada should be accountable for air pollution crossing the border
into the U.S. from a private smelter located within the borders of
Canada. 135 The arbitral tribunal held for the U.S. and awarded
damages for harm caused to crops, farm animals and private
property. 136 This case has influenced a number of International
Court of Justice [hereinafter ICJ] opinions creating or
acknowledging a general obligation not to cause harm to other
states. 1
37
The application of Trail Smelter to the cleanup of overseas
military bases is significantly flawed in the facts. In Trail Smelter,
the U.S. was damaged by the effects of a private smelter while they
received none of the benefits from the smelter operation. The U.S.
did not mutually participate or negotiate for resources resulting
from the operation of the smelter. This factually differs from a
host nation which receives economic,1 38political and national
security benefits 39 from the operation of a U.S. military base
located within its territory. 140  The host nation is the property
owner and landlord of the property which the U.S. military leases
by treaty. Often, U.S. military base operations are joint ventures
with the host nation, such as with Royal Air Force bases in the
United Kingdom which are overwhelmingly occupied by U.S.
Forces.
Over years of military occupation, the military improves the
infrastructure of its bases with buildings, roads, utilities and
Arbitration]. See also United Nations, Reports of International Arbitral Awards,
Vol. III 1905-81.
135 See id at 281 (Trail Smelter Arbitration).
136 id.
137 HUNTER ET. AL., supra note 46, at 420.
138 Waters, supra note 26, at 4; Chanbonpin, supra note 80, at 260.
139 Bayoneto, supra note 80, at 116.
140 Arguably, all domestic environmental laws impose liability and sanctions
on the responsible party regardless of any benefits actually obtained from the
contamination. However, as discussed in greater detail below, owners and
operators, those venturing to gain from the property and activity, are those held
responsible for cleanup costs.
runways. When the base is closed and turned over to its host, this
infrastructure has what is called "residual value" and is usually put
to use by the host government.'14  DoD's policy is to have the
residual value offset tax dollar investment to repair environmental
damage. 142  Residual offsets then can become the subject of
negotiations between sovereign nations.
Critics of the U.S. tend to gloss over years of benefits which a
host nation receives from the presence of a U.S. military base
within its territory. Instead, they advocate holding the U.S. solely
or overwhelmingly responsible for the base's environmental
condition. Victoria Bayoneto, discusses how the "Philippines
entered into the Military Bases Agreement in 1947 in recognition
of a mutual interest in the defense of their respective territories,
and the United State's interest in providing for the defense of the
Philippines and in developing an effective Philippine armed
forces,"'143 and how "...the Philippines received millions of dollars
in aid, in addition to military security."' 144 Yet, Bayoneto concludes
that, "The United States enjoyed this benefit [use and control over
U.S. facilities] for forty-five years. The aid given to the
Philippines was independent of this right and benefit; the aid was
thus not compensation or 'rent' for the use of the bases."'145 While
the collateral economic benefit to local communities is evident in
how U.S. states and local U.S. communities scramble to keep
military bases within their borders, 146  Bayoneto fails to
141 This author, while stationed with the U.S. Air Force in Germany from 2001
to 2003, witnessed the success of a former U.S. Air Base in Hahn, Germany that
had been converted into a flourishing inter-continental airport and secondary
aport to the Frankfurt International Airport.
Carlson, supra note 80, at 80; Waters, supra note 26, at 50.
143 Bayenoto, supra note 80, at 124.
'44 Id. at 116.
141 Id. at 154.
146 See George Cahlink, First Skirmishes in the Battle of the Bases, AIR FORCE
MAGAZINE, Dec. 2002 at 46, available at
http://www.afa.org/magazine/Dec2002/1202bases.html. See also Jim Snyder,
Communities Turn to Washington Lobbyists to help prepare for the Next Base
Closing Round, THE HILL May 14, 2003, available at
http://www.hillnews.com/business/051403-base.aspx. See also Dale Eisman, Battle
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acknowledge these and other collateral benefits realized by the
Philippines. Instead, Bayoneto argues that because there was a
shared and mutual relationship, the U.S. should unilaterally pay for
the entirety of environmental damage. She does not suggest the
Philippines should bear any responsibility for the benefits it
enjoyed from the U.S. bases. She states in conclusion, "In light of
the long and propitious relations shared by the Philippines and the
United States through politics, diplomacy, security, and
economics, it is incumbent upon the United States to accept
responsibility for the environmental damage it caused during its
occupation of the bases in the Philippines."'
147
A comment by Kim David Chanbonpin that, "[iun its treatment
of former bases in the Philippines, the United States has utilized a
double standard for the application of its environmental laws,"'
148
fails to recognize the joint benefits realized by both sovereign
States, and the fact that the Philippines will have complete future
use of the land and facilities of the former bases. Unlike a base in
the U.S. where the U.S. government and its citizens retain the land
for future enjoyment of alternative uses, the land and facilities on a
base overseas returns to the host nation and its citizens. This
article does not suggest that the U.S. can irresponsibly pollute in
other countries simply because it provides jobs, supply contracts
and other benefits to foreign nations. It simply argues that a host
nation cannot claim that the U.S. polluted- with unilateral and
exclusive benefit. To assume that a host nation does not benefit in
various economic, political and national security ways from U.S.
presence is na've. To make a blanket assumption that the host
nation cannot negotiate initial base SOFAs and cleanup is
patronizing. The host nation and the U.S. should shoulder some
degree of joint responsibility to the environment.
Rises to Save Bases, THE VIRGINIA PILOT, Oct. 11, 2003, at Al. See also Fighting for
the Economy, AMERICAN CITY AND Country, Sep. 1, 2003, available at
http://americancityandcountry.com/ar/government-fighting-economy/.
147 Bayoneto, supra note 80, at 155.
148 Chanbonpin, supra note 80, at 349.
This view is supported by the principles underlying CERCLA.
An application of CERCLA in the overseas context provides no
relief to petitioners seeking to hold the U.S. exclusively liable for
environmental damage to former overseas military bases. At the
heart of CERCLA liability is the principle of strict joint and
several liability by facility owners or operators where hazardous
wastes are disposed, and upon contracted arrangers of such
wastes. 149 The CERCLA defense that a third person caused the
environmental damage is not available if the third person is
connected to the owner or operator by any contractual
relationship. 50 CERCLA liability is broad enough to ensure
cleanup from any and all involved parties, and allows one
potentially responsible party to seek compensation for cleanup
from another potentially responsible party.
A host nation who owns the land on which the U.S. military
operates can be compared to the CERCLA "owner" of the land and
resources of a base, and the U.S. as the "operator" of the facilities.
Extending the comparison, the SOFA binds the two parties with a
contractual relationship. Under a CERCLA analysis, both the U.S.
and the host nation are jointly and severally liable for the
environmental harm. The significant difference between a
domestic and an extraterritorial application of CERCLA is that
contribution actions, 152 cost allocations 153 and settlements 154 are
not overseen by a court or an agency in an international
relationship. Instead, the two parties are left to themselves to
negotiate as sovereign nations.
149 CERCLA § 107(a); 42 USCA 9607(a).
150 CERCLA § 107 (b); 42 USCA 9607 (b); Perhaps the defense of "an act of
war" under the same subparagraph could apply in some circumstances to
overseas military bases. However, this article looks to only those circumstances
where a base does not come under direct attack. It also assumes that regular
operations in launching a war from an overseas base would not invoke the
Protections of the defense.
CERCLA §1 13(f); 42 USCA 9613(f).
152 CERCLA § 113 (f); 42 USCA 9613(f).
153 CERCLA § 107; 42 USCA 9607.
154 CERCLA § 122; 42 USCA 9622.
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Arc Ecology plaintiffs sought a preliminary assessment under
CERCLA.155 Had the court been legally able to extend CERCLA
extraterritorially, it could have arguably extended the principles of
strict joint and several liability. According to the adage, picking
up one end of the stick picks ups the other end as well. This would
leave the plaintiffs without recourse to compel the U.S. to bear any
more cost than the U.S. was willing to bear - subject, of course,
to international agreements.1
56
The Rio Declaration encourages liability schemes to protect
victims of pollution. Principle 13 reads:
States shall develop national law regarding
liability and compensation for the victims of
pollution and other environmental damage.
States shall also cooperate in an expeditious
and more determined manner to develop
further international law regarding liability
and compensation for adverse effects of
environmental damage caused by activities
within their jurisdiction or control to areas
beyond their jurisdiction. 1
57
A liability scheme envisioned by Principle 13, however, should
not interfere with sovereign integrity. Principle 12, though
expressly addressing international trade concerns, captures this
idea:
States should cooperate to promote a
supportive and open international economic
system that would lead to economic growth
and sustainable development in all countries,
to better address the problems of
environmental degradation. Trade policy
155 Arc Ecology, 294 F. Supp. 2d at 1157.
156 Phelps, supra note 43, at 77.
157 Rio Declaration, supra note 85, at 878.
measures for environmental purposes should
not constitute a means of arbitrary or
unjustifiable discrimination or a disguised
restriction on international trade. Unilateral
actions to deal with environmental
challenges outside the jurisdiction of the
importing country should be avoided.
Environmental problems should, as far as
possible, be based on an international
consensus. [emphasis added].158
As CERCLA heavily depends upon judicial and administrative
agency intervention, oversight and adjudication, imposing
CERCLA's liability scheme in the international context is
unworkable and intrudes upon national sovereignty. The notion of
strict joint and several liability without judicial oversight merely
puts sovereign nations in the place where they already exist - at the
negotiating table.
While joint and severable liability, the very heart of CERCLA,
is unworkable extraterritorially, adherence to local host nation
standards is both compatible with domestic U.S. policy and
international principles. If the U.S. military complies with the
doctrine of blending the most restrictive requirements of the
OEBGD, host national laws of general applicability, and applicable
international agreements in the ongoing operations of its bases,
159
it should apply a similar standard in the cleanup of past operations.
Domestically, the cleanup of federal facilities is subject to U.S.
state laws of general applicability. CERCLA § 120(a)(4) State
Laws provides:
State laws concerning removal and remedial
action, including State laws regarding
enforcement, shall apply to removal and
remedial action at facilities owned or
158 id.
159 DoD Instructions, supra note 57.
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operated by a department, agency, or
instrumentality of the United States or
facilities that are the subject of a deferral
under subsection (h)(3)(C) of this section
when such facilities are not included in the
National Priorities List. The preceding
sentence shall not apply to the extent a State
law would apply any standard or
requirement to such facilities which is more
stringent than the standards and
requirements applicable to facilities which
are not owned or operated by any such
department, agency, or instrumentality.'
60
While the U.S. will not sacrifice its sovereignty to
enforcements measures of the host state, nor include overseas
installations on the National Priorities List, it can secure an
environmental leadership role by deferring to the stricter of its
current standard of imposing mandatory cleanup of environmental
contamination that pose "known imminent and substantial danger
to human health and safety"'161 and the environmental cleanup laws
of the host nation. While disparate results will likely occur
between host nations, the U.S. military will be promoting a policy
that encourages its host to tighten its domestic environmental
protections across the board. This policy respects the sovereignty
of the host nation and Rio Principle 2 concerning "the sovereign
right to exploit the [host nation's] own resources pursuant to [its],,162
own environmental and developmental policies... Admittedly,
however, the U.S. and its host are not likely to escape the
negotiating table altogether. In situations where a host nation
judicially imposes a joint and several liability cleanup scheme,
such as CERCLA, issues of sovereign interference again surface.
In these circumstances, the two nations may unavoidably find
'60 CERCLA § 9620(a)(4); 42 U.S.C § 9620(A)(4) (2004).
161 Phelps, supra note 43, at 56.
162 Rio Declaration, supra note 85, at 876.
themselves at opposite ends of the table; unless, of course, the
matter is adequately addressed in the SOFA.
VI. Conclusion
Arc Ecology appropriately held that CERCLA, as it is now
written, does not apply in the cleanup of U.S. military bases
overseas. The plaintiffs in Arc Ecology failed to prove that
Congress intended the extraterritorial application of CERCLA, and
the Court denied the plaintiffs' request for a preliminary
assessment on former U.S. bases in the Philippines.
Addressing whether CERCLA principles should be expressly
adopted by statute or executive order, this article proposed that a
uniform, comprehensive Environmental Assessment should be
required by executive order prior to base closure negotiations
overseas, and that it should be made available, when appropriate,
to the international public. The opportunity for public participation
should be required when it would not interfere with the laws or
policies of a host national government. While negotiations for the
terms of base closure and environmental cleanup should remain
within the purview of sovereign nations, the onset of negotiations
should be conducted on a level playing field with other U.S. base
closures, and with consideration for providing information to host
national citizens when possible. The application of CERCLA's
liability scheme extraterritorially would invade solid principles of
sovereignty and should not be adopted. However, the U.S. should
adopt a policy of complying with its current cleanup standard or
with local host national environmental cleanup, whichever is
strictest. In cases where the host nation adopts a CERCLA joint
and several liability scheme, the U.S. and its host are left to resolve
cleanup issues under their Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) and
through negotiations.
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